Presentations - Phd EM - 31st cycle
Skype: school.socialsciences
11 AM - Laboratory 4, Doctoral School of Social Sciences, via Verdi 26
| Klaudjio Klaser |
The European Social Welfare Function Shaped on a Difference Principle: a Normative Rawlsian Approach in Favour of the Fiscal Union
Abstract
Is there any compelling moral reason for a Fiscal Union at European level? This paper is an attempt to read the European Union in the light of the Rawlsian moral theory with the purpose to understand if it is possible to derive a normative redistributive principle which fights inequalities within and across the Union. Even if the institutional European case was only marginally taken in consideration by John Rawls, the European framework can be essentially considered an appropriate object of his normative theory of domestic justice, because the European Union holds those two (descriptive) elements which are sufficient and necessary to raise redistributive issues, to apply the Rawlsian standard pure procedural justice, and then to derive a difference principle at European level: a) the mutually advantageous cooperation among its members and b) a set of formal institutions which defines a clear basic structure. The European difference principle prescribes to redistribute the resources in order to maximize the expectations of the European most disadvantaged, while the compliance with that principle, that is the concrete implementation of similar European social welfare function, conceptually implies a Fiscal Union (meant as a shared budget among the European member states) as next step towards the European institutional integration.
JEL Code: D30, E62, F55 Keywords: Difference Principle, Economic Integration, European Union, Fiscal Union, John Rawls, Social Justice |
| Thi Thanh Tam Vu |
The wolf in sheep's clothing - An experimental analysis on signaling social preferences Abstract This paper presents a novel experiment on signaling social preferences. We conduct a two-stage experiment to examine whether people manipulate social preferences upon the observability of these preferences. In the first stage, by a simple distribution task, subjects are classified into four types including inequality averse, competitive, efficiency seeking and selfish. Then they play a modified Dictator Game in which their choices in the distribution task may be observed by their matched Dictators in the second stage. We found a strong evidence that given the exposure of their preferences, people strategically employ a certain type of social preferences: Recipients only signaled themselves as either inequality averse or effi ciency seeking one, aiming at receiving higher offers. Our findings highlight the caution of using |