Seminario

Coarse Correlated Equilibria

24 novembre 2022
Orario di inizio 
14:00
Palazzo di Economia - Via Inama 5, Trento
Seminar Room, first floor
Organizzato da: 
PhD programme in Economics and Management
Destinatari: 
Tutti/e
Partecipazione: 
Ingresso libero
Speaker: 
Josef Hofbauer - University of Vienna

Abstract

Correlated equilibria (Aumann 1974) are a well-known solution concept for N-player games.
`Coarse correlated equilibria' (Young 2004), also known as the `Hannan set' (Hart and MasColell 2001), were introduced by Moulin and Vial (1978). I will discuss their relevance for evolution (replicator dynamics) and learning (fictitious play) in games.