The Rush Dilemma: Attacking and Repairing Smart Contracts on Forking Blockchains

10 September 2019 - 11 a.m.
Versione stampabile

Luogo: Room A222 Povo1, via Sommarive, 9 - Povo 
Ore: 11:00


  • Ivan Visconti (Università degli Studi di Salerno)


We investigate the security of smart contracts within a blockchain that can fork (as Bitcoin and Ethereum). In particular, we focus on multi-party computation (MPC) protocols run on-chain with the aid of smart contracts, and observe that honest players face the following dilemma: Should I rush sending protocol’s messages based on the current view of the blockchain, or rather wait that a message is confirmed on the chain before sending the next one? To the best of our knowledge, the (implicit) default option used in previous work is the second one, and thus known on-chain MPC protocols take long time to be executed on those blockchains with a long confirmation time (e.g., 1 hour per transaction in Bitcoin). While the first option would clearly be preferable for efficiency, we show that this is not necessarily the case for security, as there are natural examples of on-chain MPC protocols that simply become insecure in presence of rushing players. Our contributions are twofold: • For the concrete case of fairly tossing multiple coins with penalties, we show that the lottery protocol of Andrychowicz et al. (S&P ’14) becomes insecure in the presence of rushing players. In addition, we present a new protocol that instead retains security even if the players are rushing. • We design a compiler that takes any on-chain MPC protocol and transforms it into another one (for the same task) that remains secure even in the presence of rushing players. The only (unavoidable) requirement is that honest players start to be rushing after the first round of the protocol (by all players) has been confirmed on the blockchain. Our techniques are inspired by ideas on resettably secure computation (Goyal and Sahai, EUROCRYPT ’09). We also provide a prototype implementation of our coin tossing protocol using Ethereum smart contracts, and instantiate our generic compiler in a concrete setting, showing that both our constructions yield considerable improvements in terms of efficiency. Joint work with: Vincenzo Botta (DIEM - University of Salerno), Daniele Friolo (La Sapienza University, Rome), Daniele Venturi (La Sapienza University, Rome)

Referente: Massimiliano Sala