Evolution and efficiency in in repeated games

15 giugno 2017
15 June 2017
Contatti: 
Doctoral School of Social Sciences
via Verdi 26, 38122 - Trento
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+39 0461 283756 - 2290
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+39 0461 282335

Skype: school.socialsciences

2.30 PM, Seminar Room, Department of Economics and Management, via Inama 5.

Speaker: Stefano Demichelis, University of Pavia

Abstract

Intuition suggests that in repeated games evolution leads to efficient outcomes, we prove this result. Actions are used as implicit messages suggesting better ways to coordinate but also, in a subtler way, to assign different roles to players.This allows to endogenously break the symmetries leading to inefficiency. For coordination games and their generalizations this characterizes completely evolutionary stable payoffs. Simple “behavioral maxims”, related to the pragmatic ones, emerge in the evolutionary path.

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