The Diffusion of New Institutions: Evidence from Renaissance Veniceís Patent System

29 November 2018
Versione stampabile

2 PM, Seminar Room, Department of Economics and Management, via Inama 5

Speakers:

Abstract

We test this prediction on a new dataset that combines detailed information on craft guilds and patents in the Venetian Republic during the Renaissance. We find a negative association between patenting activity and guild statutory norms that strongly restrict entry and price competition. We show that guilds that originated from medieval religious confraternities were more likely to regulate entry and competition, and that the effect on patenting is robust to instrumenting guild statutes with their quasi-exogenous religious origin. We also find that patenting was more widespread among guilds geographically distant from Venice, and among guilds in cities with lower political connections, which we measure by exploiting a new database of noble families and their marriages with members of the great council. Our analysis suggests that local economic and political conditions may have a substantial impact on the diffusion of new economic institutions.

The paper is co - authored with Alberto Galasso (University of Toronto).