Seminar
Coarse Correlated Equilibria
24 November 2022
Start time
2:00 pm
Palazzo di Economia - Via Inama 5, Trento
Seminar Room, first floor
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Organizer:
PhD programme in Economics and Management
Target audience:
Everyone
Attendance:
Free
Speaker:
Josef Hofbauer - University of Vienna
Abstract
Correlated equilibria (Aumann 1974) are a well-known solution concept for N-player games.
`Coarse correlated equilibria' (Young 2004), also known as the `Hannan set' (Hart and MasColell 2001), were introduced by Moulin and Vial (1978). I will discuss their relevance for evolution (replicator dynamics) and learning (fictitious play) in games.
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